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CHARTING THE MIDDLE COURSE: AN
ARGUMENT FOR ROBUST BUT WELLTAILORED HEALTH CARE
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION FOR THE

TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY
John E. Farmer,Jr.*
Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act offers sweeping discriminationprotections for
patients, applicableto both health insurers and health
care providers who receive federal funding or are
subject to federal administration. Placing itself in the
canon of federal antidiscriminationlaws, Section 1557
incorporates Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.
Just how sweeping this aspect of Section 1557s
prohibitions is has been the subject of controversy
exemplified in litigation in the federal courts, as well as
in the starkly contrasting views of two presidential
administrations. The Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) under President Obama
employed its regulatory authority to construe Section
1557's prohibition of sex discrimination to encompass
discrimination based on gender identity. While much
litigation was pending in response to this executive
action, however, the administrations changed. HHS
under President Trump has since pulled back the
Obama-era construction, leaving the true scope of
Section 1557 in limbo.
While this revocation was reasonably based on
separationof powers grounds, the policy underlying the
construction was well-founded. It is well established
that the transgender community is both subject to
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unique socioeconomic difficulties and the target of
intentional health care discrimination. Just as
Congress has in the past identified classes of
individuals in need of protection in every state, it is
time for Congress to identify gender identity as one
such class. This is especially so in the health care
context because of the unique potential for abuse.
While protections implemented by an executive agency
are subject to the dissenting views of successive
administrations, as recent history has shown,
congressional action would be more insulated from
subsequent attack and more consistent with the
Constitution'sseparationof powers.
The question arises, however, as to potential conflicts
between certain health care providers' religious
freedoms and individuals for whom sex reassignment
surgery has been deemed a medically necessary
treatment for gender dysphoria. The Obama-era
regulations implementing Section 1557 refused to
incorporate a religious objection carve-out, identifying
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as an
adequate protector of religious freedom, with casespecific balancing to be done in the courts. While it
would be prudent for Congress to adopt the kind of
protection HHS sought for transgender individuals, it
simply does not make sense for any such legislation not
to incorporate a narrow religious objection carve-out
specifically with regard to sex reassignment surgery.
Any foreseeable case in federal court is likely to come
out the same way: RFRA will prevent the government
from forcing health care providers with sincerely held
religious objections to perform sex reassignment
surgeries. Thus, unnecessary litigation efforts can be
easily forestalled legislatively. Under this approach,
Section 1557 would generally prohibit all health care
discrimination against transgender individuals by
entities receiving federal funding. However, where an
individual is seeking sex reassignment surgery in
particular at a faith-based institution or from a
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physician with sincerely held religious objections, the
government would, rather than force the provider to
violate their convictions, provide the minimal funding
necessary to connect the patient with a provider that
does not, or cannot, profess such an objection.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the face of alarming discrimination against transgender
people in the health care arena, the protections established by the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act represent a vital
development in antidiscrimination law, but they should
incorporate specific, narrowly tailored religious exemptions
applicable to gender transition procedures. When a particularly
divisive social issue confounds United States policymakers, conflict
between the extreme poles of the political spectrum can hinder
lasting progress, while the vulnerable cannot afford to wait for
change. 1
Policies have shelf lives commensurate with the
transitions between administrations and congressional majorities. 2
In such a tense political climate, compromise can be a dirty word,
but this Note will argue that, in the conflict between gender
transition procedures and religious liberty, compromise is the best
way forward. That is particularly true for this issue at this time:
sentiments on this issue have reached fever pitch, with advocates
of transgender rights on the one side and advocates of religious
liberty on the other side digging in their heels with everintensifying rhetoric. 3 The problem of discrimination is too
important to allow the clash of ideologies to prevent needed
protection.
The tensions with regard to gender transition and health care
intensified on May 18, 2016, when the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) handed down a Rule (the Rule)
implementing Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and

1 See, e.g., Amy McKeever, Are We Forever Trapped in Political Gridlock?, PAC.
STANDARD (July 28, 2016), https://psmag.com/news/are-we-forever-trapped-in-political-gridl
ock (blaming partisan gridlock for the lack of gun control legislation in the wake of the
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting).
2 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump Is Rolling Back Obama's
Legacy, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/tru
mp-rolling-back-obama-rules/?utmterm=.bd44d4610eea (documenting executive actions
taken by President Donald Trump to reverse certain policy decisions of President Barack
Obama's Administration).
See, e.g., Katy Steinmetz, Why So Many States Are Fighting Over LGBT Rights in
2016, TIME (Mar. 31, 2016), http://time.com/4277247/north-carolina-georgia-lgbt-rights-reli
gious-liberty-bills/ (exploring factors contributing to state-level division over sexual
orientation and gender identity).
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Affordable Care Act (ACA). 4 Section 1557 of the ACA is very
broad, borrowing its definitions of protected classes from other
federal laws, while applying its provisions to virtually every health
care provider. 5 In the Rule, HHS defined "on the basis of sex" for
purposes of Section 1557's sex discrimination provision to include
"gender identity," which it defined as one's "internal sense of
gender," which may or may not be consistent with that assigned at
birth. 6 While HHS did not expressly state the implications of this
definition, certain entities began to imagine what those
implications might be, resulting in a rash of litigation seeking an
injunction preventing the Rule from going into effect.7 The desired
injunction finally materialized at the hands of a federal district
court on New Year's Eve in 2016.8 Following the transition from
President Barack Obama to President Donald Trump, HHS asked
for time to review the Rule, and that request was granted by the
district court in the form of a stay pending agency
reconsideration.9
That is not the only way that the change in administration has
impacted the development of the law in this area. While a recent
court challenge to a public school system's refusal to allow a
transgender boy to use the boys' restrooms seemed poised to
receive resolution from the Supreme Court, a rescission of an
Obama-era guidance prompted the court to remand to the Fourth
The case now likely awaits an
Circuit for reconsideration. 10
of the boy's graduation from
in
light
mootness
ultimate finding of
11
Given that Gloucester County School Board is a
high school.
controversy over the scope of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), it had the potential to impact
4 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376 (May 18,
2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
6 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016).
7 See discussion infra Section 1.C.
8 Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 669 (N.D. Tex. 2016), stayed sub
nom. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-cv-00108-0, 2017 WL 3616652 (N.D. Tex. July
10, 2017).
9 Price, 2017 WL 3616652, at *5.
10 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S.Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017).
11 See Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 869 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 2017) ("[W]e
conclude that it is necessary to remand this case to the district court to determine, in the
first instance, whether this case has become moot by reason of Grimm's graduation... .').
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health care discrimination because of Section 1557's incorporation
of Title IX's sex discrimination provisions. 12 Adding to the
uncertainty of the situation, the Republican sweep of both the
executive and legislative branches in the 2016 election 13 has also
precipitated moves to repeal the ACA. 14 While repeal efforts have
stalled, 15 the ACA may yet face a bleak future, which could affect
the federal protections hoped for by transgender individuals.
In the face of these developments, this Note will attempt to
introduce a way forward amidst an extremely volatile political
situation. The firestorm the Rule has generated is indicative of
what was already a hotly contested public debate. This Note will
argue that the Rule's deferral to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) will lead to-and has led tocopious amounts of litigation, while an incorporation of limited
religious exemptions could ultimately achieve the same result
without subjecting litigants on both sides to extensive litigation
costs. The provisions of § 1557 are needed. But it and its
implementing regulations should be specifically limited such that
a health care provider with sincerely held religious objections will
not be compelled to perform gender transition procedures, even if
that provider performs similar procedures for purposes not related
to gender transition.
Part II of this Note will lay the contextual foundation, including
pertinent terminology, discussion of Section 1557 and the Rule's
attempted mode of implementation, and the resulting litigation
that has led to the Rule's current state of limbo. Part III will
establish the necessity of discrimination protections for the
transgender community, particularly in the health care context. It
12 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012).
13 See generally Richard Cowan & Susan Cornwell, Republicans Defend Grip on U.S.
Congress as Trump Wins Presidency, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-election-congress/republicans-defend-grip-on-u-s-congessas-trump-wins-presidency-id
USKBN13317Z.
14 See generally Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, House Clears Path for Repeal of Health
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/us/politics/affordablecare -act-congress -budget.html.
11 See generally Kyle Cheney et al., Republicans Yank Obamacare Repeal Bill, POLITICO
(Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/obamacare-repeal-votes-congress-236
459; Robert Pear et al., Health Care Debate: Obamacare Repeal Fails as McCain Casts
Decisive No Vote, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politic
s/senate -health-care -vote.html.
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will discuss some of the community's unique vulnerabilities, inside
and outside the health care arena. It will also illuminate the
availability of and accessibility to specific remedies for these
vulnerabilities, and advocate for tailored remedies that focus on
the conduct of parties inflicting the discrimination or harassment.
Part IV will argue that Congress should pass health care-related
nondiscrimination legislation adopting HHS's interpretation of
"sex," as put forth in the Rule. It will emphasize the advantages of
a more politically-insulated method of policymaking as necessary
for stability and durability. Part V will explain how explicit
religious exemptions in the specific gender transition context are
necessary, not only for the possibility of the legislation suggested
in Part IV passing with bipartisan support, but also for such
legislation to be consistent with RFRA.

II.BACKGROUND
This issue is a complicated one, particularly in that it brings
with it a plethora of both enduring and novel medical,
psychological, and legal questions. Adding sensitivity to the topic
is the uniqueness of each individual American's moral vision and
the fact that for the estimated 1.4 million American adults who
identify as transgender, 16 the current state of affairs has more
than merely theoretical significance.
A. IMPORTANT TERMINOLOGY

To lay the foundation, defining a few key terms is necessary. At
a basic level, it is critical to understand the difference between
"gender" and "sex." Generally speaking, "sex" refers to biological
characteristics which correspond with being either male or female,
while "gender" in modern scholarship denotes those "social
16

ANDREW

R.

FLORES ET

AL.,

WILLIAMS

INST.,

How MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY

AS

TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 3 (2016), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.eduwp-cont

The study
entluploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf.
admits that there is room for improvement in data collection models available. Id. at 6. It
cites increased visibility and acceptance; as well as better methodology, as reasons why this
number doubles the Institute's 2011 estimate of almost 700,000. Id. at 6 (citing GARY J.
GATES,

WILLIAMS

INST.,

How

MANY

PEOPLE

ARE

LESBIAN,

GAY,

BISEXUAL,

AND

TRANSGENDER? 6 (2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-Ho
w-Many-People-LGBT-Apr-201 1.pdf).
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phenomena associated with being male or female." 17 According to
the American Psychiatric Association, "gender" refers to "the
public (and usually legally recognized) lived role as boy or girl,
man or woman, but, in contrast to certain social constructionist
theories, biological factors are seen as contributing, in interaction
with social and psychological factors, to gender development."1S As
for "transgender," it has become a term with a very broad scope,
referring to anyone "who transiently or persistently identif[ies]
with a gender different from their natal gender."19
The
Association has clarified that "transsexual" is more specific,
indicating that the person "seeks, or has undergone, a social
transition from male to female or female to male, which in many,
but not all, cases also involves a somatic transition by cross-sex
hormone treatment and genital surgery (sex reassignment
surgery)."20 This Note is concerned with transgender individuals
in a general sense, as the kinds of discrimination at issue are
generally felt by the whole transgender community, not just those
who have sought or undergone a "social" or "somatic" transition.
This Note will therefore predominantly use "transgender," except
in those instances where "transsexual" is more precise.
The Association has settled on using "gender dysphoria" to
describe the condition of distress resulting from any two of the
following symptoms:
1.
A
marked
incongruence
between
one's
experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or
secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents,
the anticipated secondary sex characteristics).
2. A strong desire to be rid of one's primary andlor
secondary sex characteristics because of a marked
incongruence with one's experienced/expressed gender
(or in young adolescents, a desire to prevent the
development of the anticipated secondary sex
characteristics).

17
18

ALLY WINDSOR HOWELL, TRANSGENDER PERSONS AND THE LAW 216-17 (2d ed. 2015).
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF

MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
19 Id.
20 Id.
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3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary
sex characteristics of the other gender.
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some
alternative gender different from one's assigned
gender).
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or
some alternative gender different from one's assigned
gender).
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings
and reactions of the other gender (or some alternative
21
gender different from one's assigned gender).
With the DSM-5, the Association departed from its prior use of the
term, "gender identity disorder," citing a lack of descriptiveness
and a need to focus on the resulting distress, rather than on one's
gender identity, as the clinical condition. 22 For the sake of
narrowed focus, this Note expresses no opinion on the benefits and
drawbacks of classification as a disorder and any resulting
stigmas.
B. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: MEDICAL NECESSITY,
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS, AND REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION

It is critically important that there is a clinical definition for
This clinical definition is conducive to
gender dysphoria.
classifying gender dysphoria's treatments as medically necessary.
The specific meaning of "medical necessity" is elusive, and the
term is variously defined in varying contexts. It nonetheless
generally serves as "the legal standard for health insurance
coverage in the United States."23 Yet, "[t]he Affordable Care Act
offers no definition of medical necessity and does not explain how
to distinguish between medical interventions and non-medical
Determinations about whether a particular
interventions." 24
Id. at 451-52. A child, on the other hand, must show six out of a set of eight possible
symptoms to warrant a diagnosis with gender dysphoria. Id. at 452.
21

22

Id. at 451.

23 M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH: WHY DOCTORS ARE UNDER PRESSURE TO

RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPROMISE THEIR PROMISE TO HEAL 11 (2011).
24

Janet L. Dolgin, Unhealthy Determinations: Controlling "MedicalNecessity," 22 VA. J.

SOC. POL'Y & L. 435, 475 (2015).
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service is medically necessary-and therefore whether it will be
covered-are thus left almost exclusively to insurers. 25 But by
what standard are they to make these determinations? Given
Congress's silence in the ACA itself on this point, the task of
defining medical necessity instead falls on HHS. 26
Since this determination is critical to acquiring coverage,
defining medical necessity is crucial to the transsexual individual
desiring hormone replacement therapy, sex reassignment
surgery, 27 or other procedures for the purpose of gender transition,
unless financial resources are no object. But finances are almost
always an object. As one survey found, individuals identifying as
transgender or gender non-conforming were nearly four times
more likely than the general population to have a household
income of less than $10,000 per year, and were twice as likely to be
unemployed. 28 Nonetheless, this Note does not purport to evaluate
the medical necessity of gender transition as a general matter,
given the complexities of the medical and psychological analysis
involved. However, for the sake of argument, this Note proceeds
on the assumption that gender transition may be medically
necessary in certain instances. HHS's definition 29 of "medically
necessary" procedures as those "needed to prevent, diagnose or
Id. at 444.
B. Jessie Hill, What Is the Meaning of Health? ConstitutionalImplications of Defining
"Medical Necessity" and "EssentialHealth Benefits" Under the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM.
25
26

J.L. & MED. 445, 450 (2012).
27 Many scholars prefer the alternative term, "gender confirmation surgery." See Sydney
Scott, Note, "One Is Not Born, But Becomes a Woman'" A FourteenthAmendment Argument
in Support of Housing Male-to-Female TransgenderInmates in Female Facilities,15 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1259, 1264 n.41 (2013) (noting that many commentators have begun to favor
the term "gender confirmation surgery" over "sexual reassignment surgery," but choosing to
use the latter instead). This Note expresses no opinion on the propriety of that term, but
opts instead to use "sex reassignment surgery" because it is still accurate (in that "sex,"
which means one's sex assigned at birth on the basis of biological indicia, is being
reassigned through surgical means), while "gender confirmation surgery" carries with it an
implicit premise that sits at the very center of this controversy. See infra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text. This Note opts for the term that is more likely to keep both sides of the
debate at the table, in pursuance of the stated goal of using compromise to pave a way
forward in discrimination protections for the transgender community.
28 JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN
TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER

DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2-3 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/statichtml/downloads/repor
ts/reports/ntdsfull.pdf.
29 Given the broad scope of this Note and the plurality of definitions available, this Note
is using the HHS definition for the sake of simplicity.
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treat an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms and that meet
accepted standards of medicine" 30 gives rise to some interpretive
conflicts. What does "needed" mean, and who in particular gets to
Even more
decide what is "needed" in a particular case?
perplexingly, who sets the "accepted standards of medicine"?
These are not novel questions, as they also arise with regard to
Medicare, 31 Medicaid, 32 and private insurers. 33 This is further
complicated by the fact that the Rule sought to prohibit any
blanket consideration of gender transition procedures as medically
unnecessary.3 4 On the other hand, the Rule did not state that such
35
procedures would have been medically necessary in every case.
The resulting situation is that determinations of medical necessity
are made on a fact-intensive, case-by-case basis. This is the most
intuitive approach, given the uniqueness of individual cases in any
medical context. But, it does result in uncertainty at a global
level.
The resulting debate surrounding medical necessity, therefore,
is about whether it is possible for gender transition procedures to
be medically necessary. The position that the medical necessity of
at least some transition-related procedures is a blanket
impossibility 36 is a high bar to clear. The alternative position30 Summary of Benefits and Coverage and Uniform Glossary-Templates, Instructions,
and Related Materials Under the Public Health Service Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,475, 52,529
app. E (Aug. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
31 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)-(E) (2012) (using "reasonable and necessary" as the
standard for determining whether certain medical expenses are payable under Medicare).
32 See, e.g., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., EPSDT - A GUIDE FOR STATES:

COVERAGE IN THE MEDICAID BENEFIT FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 23 (2014), https://

www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/benefits/downloads/epsdt-coverage-guide.pdf ("Services that fit
within the scope of coverage under [Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and
Treatment] must be provided to a child only if necessary to correct or ameliorate the
individual child's physical or mental condition, i.e., only if 'medically necessary.' ").
n See Dolgin, supra note 24, at 444 (describing the overarching authority of insurance
companies to make medical necessity determinations, including for patients with private
insurance coverage).
3 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,429
(May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., First Amended"Complaint at 38, Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp.
3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (No. 7:16-cv-00108-0) ("Some of the procedures required under the
Rule, including hysterectomies for gender transition, would result in the sterilization of the
patient. Since Franciscan does not believe such a hysterectomy is medically necessary,
being forced to provide such a sterilization procedure would violate Franciscan's best
medical judgment and religious beliefs.").
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represented by the Obama-era HHS approach-that there are
some situations in which gender transition procedures are
medically necessary37 is by contrast a much lower bar.
Those arguing against the possibility of medically necessary
gender transition, such as states administering Medicaid policies,
have tended to argue that gender transition procedures are either
"cosmetic" or "experimental" in nature. 38 HHS expressly rejected
this view in adopting the Rule, asserting that such a view is
"outdated and not based on current standards of care." 39 In
response to this characterization, the Franciscan Alliance
plaintiffs accused HHS of egregiously overstepping its authority:
It is not in accordance with law, within the meaning of
[the Administrative Procedure Act,]
5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A), 40 for the federal government to dictate
appropriate medical views on the necessity and
experimental nature of medical transition procedures,
and to dictate what constitutes best standards of care
in an area of science and medicine that is being hotly
41
debated in the medical community.
The characterization of the question as "hotly debated"
certainly seems misleading in light of one tax case's ruling:
37 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(d) (2016) ("Nothing in this section is intended to
determine, or restrict a covered entity from determining, whether a particular health
service is medically necessary or otherwise meets applicable coverage requirements in any
individual case.').
38 See, e.g., Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1156-57 (5th Cir. 1980) (remanding to the
trial court to find whether "[Georgia's] determination that transsexual surgery is
experimental is reasonable'); Rush v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 856, 868 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
("[Tihe court finds that the State could reasonably determine that transsexual surgery is
experimental. The evidence demonstrates that it is neither generally accepted as a proven
and effective treatment nor is there authoritative evidence that the surgery is safe and
effective."). But see Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (accusing Iowa's
blanket determination of sex reassignment surgeries to be medically unnecessary of
"reflect[ing] inadequate solicitude for the applicant's diagnosed condition, the treatment
prescribed by the applicant's physicians, and the accumulated knowledge of the medical
community").
39 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,435.
40 This statute requires a court reviewing an administrative agency action to strike it
down if the court determines it to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."
41 First Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 43.
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Hormone therapy, sex reassignment surgery and,
under certain conditions, breast augmentation surgery
interventions,
or
are
prescribed
therapeutic
treatments, for [Gender Identity Disorder (GID)]
outlined in the Benjamin standards of care. The
Benjamin standards are widely accepted in the
psychiatric profession, as evidenced by the recognition
of the standards' triadic therapy sequence as the
appropriate treatment for GID and transsexualism in
numerous psychiatric and medical reference texts.
Indeed, every psychiatric reference text that has been
established as authoritative in this case endorses sex
reassignment surgery as a treatment for GID in
appropriate circumstances. No psychiatric reference
text has been brought to the Court's attention that
fails to list, or rejects, the triadic therapy sequence or
sex reassignment surgery as the accepted treatment
regimen for GID. Several courts have accepted the
Benjamin standards as representing the consensus of
the medical profession regarding the appropriate
42
treatment for GID or transsexualism.
The most compelling argument for the view that gender
transition can be medically necessary is more philosophical than
legal in nature. The argument begins with the premise that
gender identity is deeply ingrained in a person's identity and "is
the most important determinant of a person's sex," but "may be
congruent or incongruent with the doctor's determination of sex
made at the time of birth."43 This argument reframes the issue
and cuts strongly against the argument that gender transition
44
procedures are experimental or cosmetic.

42

O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 34, 65-67 (2010) (footnotes omitted).

43 M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect Modern

Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 951-52 (2015) (footnotes
omitted).
44 See id. at 952 ("Some people experience discomfort or distress caused by the
discrepancy between their gender identity and sex assigned at birth. This distress may
reach a clinical level where it may support a formal diagnosis of gender dysphoria, a serious
medical condition.").
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Of course, concerns about medical necessity largely have to do
with whether one's insurer will cover a procedure rather than with
who will perform it. How, then, might a health care provider be
implicated? First, the tides seem to be changing. For instance, the
American Medical Association passed a 2008 resolution which
acknowledged that "[a]n established body of medical research
demonstrates the- effectiveness and medical necessity of mental
health care, hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery as
forms of therapeutic treatment for many people diagnosed with
[gender dysphoria]." 45
Second, and most importantly, the
language of Section 1.557 has more than just insurance companies
in mind. It provides the following discrimination protections, in
pertinent part:
[A]n individual shall not, on the ground prohibited
under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or
section 794 of title 29, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any health program or activity,
any part of which is receiving Federal financial
assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of
insurance, or under any program or activity that is
administered by an Executive Agency or any entity
established under this title .... 46
Sidney D. Watson explains how this provision applies more
broadly than just to insurance companies: "[I]nclusion of 'contracts
of insurance' makes clear that Section 1557 reaches physicians
and other health care providers who accept Medicare Part B

45 AM. MED. ASS'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REMOVING FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO CARE FOR
TRANSGENDER PATIENTS (2008), http://www.tgender.net/taw/amaresolutions.pdf (emphasis

added).
46 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). The
incorporation of Title IX is the relevant incorporation for this Note, as Title IX is the provision
providing protection against sex discrimination specifically. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
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insurance.

. ... ,47 As has been elsewhere noted, prior to the ACA,
a physician's acceptance of Medicare Part B had been considered a
"contract of insurance" but not federal financial assistance that

subjects a doctor to federal civil rights laws. 48 Section 1557 may
change that by including the former within the latter. 49 The
weight of this shift is evident in a 2015 study's finding that 93% of
primary care physicians accept Medicare. 50 Professor Watson also
explains, "Section 1557's specificity that federal financial
assistance includes 'credits' and 'subsidies' unequivocally
establishes that Section 1557's antidiscrimination mandate covers
private insurance companies, physicians, and other providers who
will be receiving new federal tax credits and subsidies authorized
by the ACA."5 1 The resulting implication is that health care
providers are now likely subject to civil rights laws in new ways
under Section 1557.
The question then becomes what kinds of discrimination are
envisioned by Section 1557.
The ACA deferred to multiple
previously enacted federal laws to define the classes protected
from discrimination, with Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 providing the definition of "sex discrimination" for the
ACA's nondiscrimination purposes. That provision states that
"[n]o person.., shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance," subject to a number of enumerated
exceptions. 52 One such exception that is central to this discussion
states that Title IX "shall not apply to an educational institution
which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of

47 Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health
Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 How. L.J. 855, 873 (2012).
48 Andrew C. Stevens, Patient DiscriminationLitigation Under Section 1557 of the ACAA Sleeping Giant?,9 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 111, 115 (2016).
49 See id. ("Section 1557 may have done away with this longstanding interpretation. This
would.., extend Section 1557's prohibitions to cover private physicians... accepting
payments under Medicare Part B.").
50 CRISTINA BoCCUTI ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRIMARY CARE
PHYSICIANS ACCEPTING MEDICARE: A SNAPSHOT 1 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment.dat

e-note-primary-care-physicians-accepting-medicare-a-snapshot.
51 Watson, supra note 47, at 873.
52 Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
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this subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of
53
such organization."
The fact that the ACA defers in its specific nondiscrimination
provision to other federal laws has led to particular controversy as
applied to transgender individuals. It has not been clearly settled
whether Title IX now means that transgender individuals are a
class protected from discrimination under its "sex discrimination"
rubric. The Obama Administration certainly took one side, as
evidenced by a May 2016 guidance jointly issued by the
Department of Justice and the Department of Education. 54 That
guidance argued that federal administrative agencies, in practice,
"treat a student's gender identity as the student's sex for purposes
of Title IX and its implementing regulations." 55 It also cited two
Supreme Court cases 56 addressing sex discrimination claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 57-Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services.5 8 Notably,
neither concerns sex discrimination against a transgender
individual. Oncale was, however, concerned with a claim of maleon-male sexual harassment, in regards to which Justice Antonin
Scalia reasoned, writing for the Court:
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual
harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it
enacted Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]. But
statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the

Id. § 1681(a)(3).
54 U.S. Dep't of Just. and U.S. Dep't of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender
Students 2, 6 nn.4-5 (May 13, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleag
ue-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf. See also Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm,
137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017) (remanding in light of this joint guidance).
55 Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, supra note 54, at 2.
5 Id. at 6 n.5.
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
58 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
63
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principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
59
governed.
The most authoritative references in the Obama-era joint guidance
60
were four federal circuit court interpretations of federal law.
is
With respect to three of those cases, their precedential authority
61
limited to the federal circuit in which each case was decided.
With respect to the fourth case cited in the joint guidance, G.G.
ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, the case will
likely never result in a binding merits determination. The Fourth
Circuit originally concluded in Gloucester County School Board
that the Department of Education could rest upon its own
interpretation of its own regulations, and that its interpretation
was entitled to deference. 62 The Department of Justice and
Department of Education under President Donald Trump's
Administration, however, have since rescinded the Obama-era
joint guidance, arguing that such a "substantive" policy decision
warranted formal rulemaking procedures. 63 That development led
the Supreme Court to revoke certiorari and remand it to the
Fourth Circuit in light of the rescission. 64 Following a subsequent
remand by the Fourth Circuit back to the district court, the case is
mootness
inevitable
seemingly
a
towards
barreling
65
determination.
As for the ACA itself, its nondiscrimination provision provides:
"The Secretary [of HHS] may promulgate regulations to

59 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
60 Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, supra note 54, at 2, 6 n.5.
61 See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in the
context of the Gender Motivated Violence Act, the plaintiffs transsexuality was an element
of his gender, not of gender dysphoria); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213,
215 (1st Cir. 2000) (considering it a reasonable inference that the plaintiff, a man dressed
as a woman, was denied credit by a bank on the basis of sex, which is protected under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, rather than on the basis of style of dress, which is not so
protected); Glenn v. Bumbry, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) ("[D]iscrimination
against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination,
whether it's described as being on the basis of sex or gender.").
62 G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated sub nom. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
63 U.S. Dep't of Just. and U.S. Dep't of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter 1 (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/94202 1/download.
64 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S.Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017).
66 Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 869 F.3d 286, 286 (4th Cir. 2017).
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implement this section." 66 It was in this implementing function
that HHS handed down the Rule at issue. That Rule provided two
definitions that gave rise to the litigation discussed below in
Section II.C: "on the basis of sex" and "gender identity." First, the
Rule defined "on the basis of sex" in Title IX, and thus in Section
1557, to "include[] ...discrimination on the basis of... gender
identity."6 7 Then, critically and controversially, HHS defined
"gender identity" as "an individual's internal sense of gender,
which may be male, female, neither, or a combination of male and
female, and which may be different from an individual's sex
assigned at birth."68
Had the Rule remained in effect, the
implications of this construction of Title IX would have been
somewhat unpredictable, but HHS adopted a bold, forwardthinking approach, notwithstanding its seeming concurrence with
the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. 69 In its response to
comments on the Rule, HHS explained its reasoning and
implementation measures regarding gender transition procedures
in particular:
Historically, covered entities have justified... blanket
exclusions by categorizing all transition-related
treatment as cosmetic or experimental. However, such
across-the-board categorization is now recognized as
outdated and not based on current standards of care.
...[A]n explicit, categorical (or automatic) exclusion
or limitation of coverage for all health services related
to gender transition is unlawful on its face under
paragraph (b)(4)7 °; ...such an exclusion or limitation
66

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(c) (2012).

67 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016).
68

Id.

69 See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in the

context of the Gender Motivated Violence Act, the plaintiffs transsexuality was an element
of his gender, not of gender dysphoria); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213,
215 (1st Cir. 2000) (considering it a reasonable inference that the plaintiff, a man dressed
as a woman, was denied credit by a bank on the basis of sex, which is protected under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, rather than on the basis of style of dress, which is not so
protected); Glenn v. Bumbry, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) ("[D]iscrimination
against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination,
whether it's described as being on the basis of sex or gender.").
70 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b)(4) (2016) ("A covered entity shall not, in providing or
administering health-related insurance or other health-related coverage... [h]ave or
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systematically denies services and treatments for
is
prohibited
and
individuals
transgender
discrimination on the basis of sex.
Moreover, we proposed in § 92.207(b)(5) to bar a
covered entity from denying or limiting coverage, or
denying a claim for coverage, for specific health
services related to gender transition where such a
denial or limitation results in discrimination against a
transgender individual....
... [T]hese provisions do not, however, affirmatively
require covered entities to cover any particular
for
transition-related
or
treatment
procedure
71
....
care
The effect of these regulatory determinations, had they not been
enjoined and subsequently walked back by the Trump-era HHS,
would have been (1) prohibition of wholesale refusal of coverage
(by insurance companies) and services (by health care providers)
for the purpose of gender transition, (2) prohibition of
individualized discrimination by an insurer or provider in a
particular case, and (3) allowance of a reasoned refusal in a
With respect to religious objections, HHS
particular case.
explained its decision not to incorporate Title IX's blanket religious
exemption as follows:
[C]ertain protections already exist in Federal law with
respect to religious beliefs, particularly with regard to
health-related
certain
of
provision
the
services.... Nothing in this final rule displaces those
protections.
... [W]e believe that applying the protections in
[provider conscience laws, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), and ACA provisions
related to abortion services or preventive health
services] offers the best and most appropriate

implement a categorical coverage exclusion or limitation for all health services related to
gender transition .... ).
71 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,429
(May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) (footnotes omitted).
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approach for resolving any conflicts between religious
beliefs and Section 1557 requirements....
... The RFRA analysis evaluates whether a legal
requirement substantially burdens the exercise of
religion; if so, the question becomes whether the legal
requirement furthers a compelling interest and is the
least restrictive means to further that interest.
We believe that the government has a compelling
interest
in
ensuring
that
individuals
have
nondiscriminatory access to health care and health
coverage and, under RFRA, would assess whether a
particular application of Section 1557 substantially
burdened a covered entity's exercise of religion and, if
so, whether there were less restrictive alternatives
available. Claims under RFRA are individualized and
fact specific and we would make these determinations
on a case-by-case basis, based on a thorough analysis
and relying on the extensive case law interpreting
RFRA standards.
We decline to adopt ... Title IX's blanket religious
exemption into Section 1557.
Section 1557 itself
contains no religious exemption. In addition, Title IX
and its exemption are limited in scope to educational
institutions, and there are significant differences
between the educational and health care contexts that
72
warrant different approaches.
HHS went on to assert that those distinctions between the
education and health care contexts are (1) that education is often a
matter of choice-and one of abundant choices at that-while in
health care there may be more limited options available, especially
in an emergency situation, and (2) that a blanket religious
exemption like that contained in Title IX could give way to denial
or delay that may disincentivize individuals from pursuing needed
73
medical attention.

72

Id. at 31,379-31,380.

73 Id. at 31,380.
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As with all agency determinations, HHS's determination was
potentially entitled to Chevron deference.7 4 In Chevron, the Court
established a two-part test for such entitlement. 75 First, if
Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue," 76a
court's analysis ends, and Congress's intent must be given effect.
If Congress has not so spoken, however, the court must proceed to
the second prong of the test and ask "whether the agency's answer
[to the question at issue] is based on a permissible construction of
If the agency's determination "represents a
the statute."77
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute, [a court] should not
disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned."7 8 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recently
shown hesitancy when an agency, the Internal Revenue Service,
acted upon a supposedly implied delegation of authority with
regard to "a question of deep 'economic and political significance'
that is central to this statutory scheme." 79 It is conceivable that
the HHS Rule, an expansion of civil rights protections of similarly
"deep political significance," might also have been deserving of
heightened scrutiny. This is one of the main questions that gave
rise to such a quick rash of litigation.
C. LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE HHS IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 1557

In the latter half of 2016, three health care providers and five
states-Texas, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Kentucky, and Kansassuccessfully challenged the regulation under the Chevron line of
cases.8 0 The plaintiffs filed a lengthy and count-heavy complaint
on August 23, 2016 in the United States District Court for the

14

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

75 Id. at 842-43.
76

Id.

77 Id. at 843.
78

Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).

79 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,

134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
80 Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
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Northern District of Texas.8 1 On December 31, 2016, the court
issued an injunction preventing the Rule from going into effect,
pending any subsequent appeals.8 2 The complaint characterized
the Rule as an overreach that would force doctors to "perform
[gender transition] procedures even when they are contrary to the
doctor's medical judgment and could result in significant, longterm medical harm," despite such a doctor's "deeply held religious
beliefs" that "will not allow them to perform medical transition
procedures that can be deeply harmful to their patients."8 3 The
complaint further alleged that HHS forced such requirements on
the plaintiffs and those similarly situated in the face of repeated
congressional refusals to redefine "sex" through legislation, despite
the fact that "federal courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to
accomplish the same goal through litigation."8 4 Siding with the
plaintiffs, the court issued the injunction based solely upon the
first prong of the Chevron analysis.8 5 The court first found no
ambiguity in Section 1557's incorporation of the Title IX
framework.8 6
Next, the court concluded that Title IX
unambiguously defines "sex" as "the biological and 'anatomical
differences between male and female students as determined at
their birth."8 7 The court found influential (1) the common
understanding of "sex" as biological sex at the time of Title IX's
enactment in 1972, (2) the ACA's differentiation of arrangements
for males and females in its other provisions, and (3) the fact that
at the time of the ACA's enactment in 2010, no federal court had
interpreted Title IX sex discrimination to include gender
identity.8 8 For good measure, the court added that "a commonsense approach" is mandated by the Supreme Court in
determining whether Congress delegated "policy decision[s] of
such economic and political magnitude to an administrative
81 First Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 1-4. Notably, two similar complaints have
since been filed in the District of North Dakota. Complaint, Religious Sisters of Mercy v.
Burwell, No. 3:16-cv-386 (D.N.D. Nov. 7, 2016); Verified Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief, Catholic Benefits Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 3:16-cv-432 (D.N.D. Dec. 28, 2016).
82 FranciscanAll., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 670.
83 First Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 2-3.
84 Id.
"I FranciscanAll., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 687.
86 Id. at 686-87.
87 Id. at 687 (quoting Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 833 (N.D. Tex. 2016)).
88 Id. at 688--89.
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agency."8 9 President Trump's HHS has since reversed course from
that of the Obama Administration, successfully requesting that
the district court remand to HHS so that it can reconsider the
Rule. 90 This Note will therefore proceed by charting a path
towards reasonable discrimination protections that may prove
more lasting than the polarizing pendulum swings that have so far
maligned this issue.
III. THE NEED FOR DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS THAT FOCUS ON
THE ROOT CAUSES

Lost in the debates surrounding gender identity are the often
horrifying vulnerabilities to which the transgender community is
subject. Some of these are unique to the transgender experience,
Similarly, some arise out of innocent
and some are not.
circumstances, while others can be traced to more sinister origins.
What is most needed is an approach that isolates the particular
Gender
vulnerabilities and generates targeted solutions.
transition may be a medically necessary remedy in particular
circumstances. An approach that deems gender transition to be a
medically necessary solution at a more generalized level, however,
would be overly sweeping and simplistic. The same flaw plagues a
blanket refusal to acknowledge the incongruence that transgender
individuals feel between their natal sex and their felt, lived, or
experienced gender identity. As partisan as this issue is, the best
way forward-especially in the near term-is a meeting in the
middle.
A. THE HARSH REALITIES FACING THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY

Many of the challenges this community faces stem from
socioeconomic roots. 91 For instance, as noted by Allison S. Bohm,
there is a significant correlation between transgender status and

89 Id. at 687 (quoting Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
90 Franciscan All., Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-cv-00108, 2017 WL 3616652, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
July 10, 2017).
91 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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homelessness. 92 One potential cause is the discrimination that
transgender individuals face, as evidenced by one study finding
that one in five transgender individuals had been denied housing
and one in ten had been evicted specifically because of their gender
identity. 93
Complicating the issue of homelessness among
transgender youth, in Bohm's estimation, is the "difficulty in
securing placement in gender-segregated shelters, or [being]
placed in shelters at odds with their gender identity."94
Furthermore, a study by the National Center for Transgender
Equality found that the incarceration rate for transgender
individuals dwarfs that of the general population. 95 At least one
potential cause of these socioeconomic challenges is the
employment
discrimination
transgender individuals
often
experience: "[r]espondents who had lost a job due to bias also
experienced ...four times the rate of homelessness, 70% more
current drinking or misuse of drugs..., 85% more incarceration,
more than double the rate working in the underground economy,
and more than double the HIV infection rate.. ,,96 Confirming
the gravity of those findings is the fact that 90% of transgender
individuals surveyed had experienced "harassment, mistreatment
''97
or discrimination on the job or took actions ...to avoid it.
Grant's study also found that 35% of respondents had experienced
physical assault in a primary school setting. 98 A similar study by
the Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network found that

92

See, e.g., Allison S. Bohm et al., Challenges FacingLGBT Youth, 17 GEO. J. GENDER &

L. 125, 162 (2016) (citing JODY MARKSAMER, NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, A PLACE OF
RESPECT: A GUIDE FOR GROUP CARE FACILITIES SERVING TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NON-

CONFORMING YOUTH 20 (2011), http://www.aei.org/wp-contentluploads/2013/07/A Place-Of
_Respect.pdf) (showing that transgender youth are particularly susceptible to housing
crises).
93 Id. at 163 (citing MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., UNDERSTANDING ISSUES
FACING TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 4 (2015), http://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/unders

tanding-issues-facing-transgender-americans.pdO.
94 Id. (citing SHANNON MINTER & CHRISTOPHER DALEY, NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS
& TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., TRANS REALITIES: A LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SAN
FRANCISCO'S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 9 (2003), http://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/

understanding-issues-facing-transgender-americans.pdf).
95 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 28, at 163 (reporting a 17% incarceration rate for
transgender individuals as compared to 2.7% for the general populace).
96 Id. at 3.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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54.5% of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender respondents
reported verbal harassment and 20.3% reported physical
harassment because of their gender expression." Another 9.4% in
that study reported being physically assaulted because of their
gender expression. 10 0 In a troubling number of cases, transgender
10 1
Tragically, in light of such
people are victims of murder.
persecution, it is perhaps10 2no surprise that suicide also plagues the
transgender community.
While these statistics paint a sobering picture of holistic
suffering, the transgender community also faces some challenges
unique to the health care setting. This is not limited to the gender
transition context, but also can severely taint the overall health
care experience, even when transgender patients are seeking the
0 3 These
same sort of basic care sought by the broader public.
kinds of challenges can be further exacerbated in the cases of
10 4 In
elderly, veteran, and incarcerated transgender individuals.
the National Center for Transgender Equality's 2011 survey, the
discrimination experienced in health care settings led to a 28%
rate of respondents postponing medical care to avoid
discrimination, a 19% rate of health care providers refusing to
provide care, and a 2% rate of respondents actually experiencing
10 5 This horrific picture
some form of violence in a doctor's office.
99 JOSEPH G. KosCIW ET AL., GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, THE 2015
NATIONAL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCE OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER,

AND QUEER YOUTH IN OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS, at xvi (2016), https://www.glsen.org/sites/defau
2
lt/files/2015%2ONational%2SchoolGLSEN%202015%2National%2School%20Climate% 0S
urvey%20%28NSCS%29%20-%2OFul%2OReportO.pdf.
100 Id. For a discussion of the impact of bullying in schools, see Bohm et al., supra note 92,
at 151-52.
TRANS DAY OF
101 See TRANSRESPECT VERSUS TRANSPHOBIA WORLDWIDE, TMM UPDATE:

REMEMBRANCE 2016, at 1 (2016), http://transrespect.org/wp.contentJuploads/2016/llfIvT %M
M %DoR2016_SimpleTableEN.pdf (documenting twenty-three murders of transgender
individuals in the United States between October 2015 and September 2016).
102 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 28, at 82 (recording a 41% rate of "yes" responses to the
question of whether respondents had ever attempted suicide).
103 See, e.g., Nikki Burrill & Valita Fredland, The Forgotten Patient:A Health Provider's
Guide to Providing Comprehensive Care for Transgender Patients, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
69, 78 (2012) (documenting hostility, humiliation, objectification, jokes, and leering by
health care providers).
104 See id. at 74-76 (presenting causes, complexities, and potential solutions in the specific
contexts of assisted living facilities, Veterans' Affairs medical facilities, and correctional
facilities).
105 GRANT ET AL., supra note 28, at 72.
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makes clear the necessity of federal protections for transgender
individuals in health care settings.
B. THE PROBLEM WITH VIEWING GENDER TRANSITION PROCEDURES
AS A UNIVERSAL, MULTI-PURPOSE REMEDY TO THE DIVERSE ARRAY OF
VULNERABILITIES THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY FACES

Some advocates have argued that enabling access to gender
transition
procedures
will
go furthest
in addressing
discrimination.
For example, Jennifer Wong argued that
"[t]ransition-related healthcare has the potential to help alleviate
many forms of violence.... Taken together, individually
experienced, socially perceived, and systemically acknowledged
congruence between expressed and documented gender identity
works to open various economic opportunities to transgender
populations." 10 6 While it may or may not be true that it would go
the furthest, there are other costs to consider, particularly when it
comes to what the federal government classifies as actionable
discrimination. Nondiscrimination provisions governing health
programs are needed, but they should be specifically written and
narrowly construed so that discrimination does not get confused
with the conscientious practice of a medical professional. This is
not to say that an individual should be disallowed from pursuing
such procedures as a matter of personal autonomy, but merely
that the need for more targeted solutions counsels against
guaranteeing the accessibility of such procedures in the face of
sincerely-held religious objections on the part of health care
providers. Examples of more targeted solutions could include
criminal remedies for criminal violations; related efforts to ensure
the ability of transgender individuals to trust law enforcement;
better training for educators, correctional officers, social workers,
and health care professionals; enforcement mechanisms to provide
accountability to this training; and provision for counseling or
other mental health needs that arise as a result of these traumatic
experiences.

106 Jennifer
Wong, Note, Recasting Transgender-Inclusive Healthcare Coverage: A
ComparativeInstitutionalApproach to TransgenderHealthcareRights, 31 LAW & INEQ. 471,
486 (2013).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2017

27

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2017], Art. 8

252

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:225

The main problem with approaches that advocate for the
required provision of sought-after gender transition services is
that the root of many of the problems in this area is bias. Bias is a
problem on the part of perpetrators, insensitive doctors, and the
like. Therefore, casting gender transition as a universal fix is not
well-tailored to the problems it seeks to address in particular
cases. Wong, in advocating for heightened accessibility to gender
transition procedures, seems to acknowledge this:
At the outset, this view of gender-confirming care is
largely illusory because it presents medically
facilitated gender conformance as a solitary solution,
and it portrays a falsely linear progression of
Gender
events.
cyclical
often
overlapping,
conformance is not a solution to ending antitransgender violence or discrimination, but "[t]he
isolating of only some of these processes for critique,
while ignoring others, is a classic exercise in
Gender-confirming healthcare also
domination."
opportunities if a lack of
economic
open
cannot
from
individuals
bars
opportunities
economic
Furthermore, understanding
obtaining such care.
gender conformance as merely a remedial response to
violence hinders understanding medically facilitated
selfand
of autonomy
acts
as
transitions
With these shortcomings in mind,
determination.
however, outlook may help conceptualize the role that
gender-confirming healthcare can play at individual,
social, and institutional levels in order to illuminate
why ensuring its availability is a crucial component of
10 7
securing transgender rights.
Wong's passion for the pressing problems facing the transgender
community is both admirable and necessary. Nonetheless, a more
nuanced approach would be more consistent with legal principles
that seek to balance the interests of multiple parties.
Furthermore, in light of the political deadlock that this issue has
at 486-87 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dean Spade, Dress to Kill, Fight to Win,
107 Id.
LTTR, http://lttr.org/journall/dress-to-kill-fight-to-win (last visited Nov. 5, 2012)).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss1/8

28

Farmer: Charting the Middle Course: An Argument for Robust But Well-Tailo

2017]

CHARTING THE MIDDLE COURSE

253

seemingly generated,10 8 a more creative option would also be more
palatable for those individuals who typically hold viewpoints that
oppose the transgender community's interests.
In particular,
although principles like "autonomy and self-determination"
certainly have their place in this discussion, the autonomy of one
party cannot be used to trounce the autonomy of another. But that
is precisely what happens when one seeks to assert a "right" to a
gender transition procedure performed in a faith-based health care
facility or by a conscientiously objecting physician.
Wong's
acknowledgment that more targeted remedies to discriminatory
conduct are needed is nowhere more accurate than in the context
of gender transition procedures. Although it is reasonable to allow
someone to pursue such a procedure for themselves, requiring a
provider with a consciously held religious objection to provide it
goes too far.
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL ADOPTION OF HHS's
INTERPRETATION OF "SEX" FOR USE IN HEALTH CARE-RELATED
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS

Given the litany of woes enumerated in Part III, even if HHS
may have gotten the law wrong in handing down the Rule, it got
the policies right. Now is the time for the transgender community
to be considered a protected class under federal civil rights laws,
especially in the context of health care. The main problem with
the implementation of Section 1557 by the Obama-era HHS, given
the drastic policy changes it advocated, was that it was HHS that
was making the changes. 10 9 The merits of the Rule were mostly
positive, with the exception of the intentional refusal to
incorporate Title IX's religious exemption in the gender transition
context. As such, Congress should adopt measures establishing
discrimination protections for transgender individuals in health
care settings, so that there is comprehensive protection in the
pursuit of health care needs. Such measures ideally would be
passed with bipartisan support to ensure long-term sustainability,
even if some compromise on both sides of the aisle is necessary in
pursuit of that outcome.
108See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
109 Notably, the Trump-era HHS rewriting the Rule does not solve this problem.
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A. THE MERITS AND FLAWS OF THE HHS INTERPRETATION

In the Rule, HHS sought to codify protections consistent with
recent interpretations of Title IX: "We noted that like other
Federal agencies, HHS has previously interpreted sex
discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of gender
identity. We also noted that courts, including in the context of
Section 1557, have recognized that sex discrimination includes
discrimination based on gender identity."110 With that said, given
the Supreme Court's inability to rule on the merits of Gloucester
County School Board, none of those interpretations are universally
binding."1
Those interpretations do, however, seem to be
consistent with the increasing number of people identifying as
transgender and the greater societal shift toward acceptance of
transgender individuals. 112 Given these societal shifts, HHS's
attempt to offer protection in the health care context is easily
defensible. Take, for instance, the account of one respondent in
the National Center for Transgender Equality study: "I was forced
to have a pelvic exam by a doctor when I went in for a sore throat.
The doctor invited others to look at me while he examined me and
talked to them about my genitals." 11 3 This kind of experience
would dissuade any reasonable person from seeking needed
medical attention, even in an emergency. Accordingly, it is hard to
blame HHS for attempting to classify such conduct by health care
providers as actionable discrimination.
The Rule, however, suffers from two deficiencies, one related to
its decision about how to apply Section 1557's incorporation of
Title IX, and one related to the significance of its policy decisions.
First, HHS eschewed Title IX's religious exemption, a permissible
but unwise act of selectivity. Second, in its interpretation of "sex"
as defined by Title IX, HHS made a radical policy decision without
110Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,387
(May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) (footnotes omitted).
- See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017)
(remanding the case in light of the Trump administration's course reversal with respect to
sex discrimination and gender identity).
112 See FLORES ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 ("Our current best estimate of the percentage of
adults who identify as transgender in the United States is double that of [a 2011

estimate].... A perceived increase in visibility and social acceptance [may account for this].').
113

GRANT ETAL., supra note 28, at 74.
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clear delegation of authority to make such a determination in the
statute itself.
Largely speaking, Congress seems to have opted for simplicity
over clarity in Section 1557. Without comment or explanation,
Congress simply incorporated other federal laws to define the
various forms of discrimination prohibited under its terms, with
Title IX defining sex discrimination. 114 It provided that "an
individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under.., title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972... be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under" one of Section 1557's enumerated types of
health programs. 115 The "ground prohibited" in Title IX was "on
11 6 Most of
the basis of sex," subject to a number of exceptions.
those exceptions would be practically inapplicable to a health care
context.1 17 One exception, however, that would readily apply to
health care systems is the religious exemption, which HHS
intentionally elected not to include.1 18 That exemption reads, "this
section shall not apply to an educational institution which is
controlled by a religious organization if the application of this
subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of
such organization."' 19 Given that so many of the exemptions in
Title IX would be illogical in the health care context, it seems fair
to assume that Congress did not intend for the exemptions to be
incorporated in Section 1557. That does not mean, however, that
HHS was bound not to incorporate any of the exemptions. Title
IX's religious exemption lends itself remarkably well to a health
care nondiscrimination provision, given the number of faith-based
health care providers with well-established religious objections to
120
gender transition.

114

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012).

115

Id.

Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
117 See, e.g., id. § 1681(a)(9) (exempting institutional scholarships connected to beauty
116

pageants).
11 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,380
(May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
119 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3).
120 See, e.g., JULIA KAYE ET AL., ACLU, HEALTH CARE DENIED 22 (2016) (finding that as of
March 2016, one in six hospital beds in the United States sits in a Catholic hospital, a 22%
increase since 2001).
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HHS's explanation for not incorporating the religious
exemption, that the health care context is distinct, is
unsatisfactory. First, HHS asserted that there are less hospitals
to choose from than schools, especially in an emergency
situation. 121 This is plainly irrelevant in a gender transition
context. These are the types of procedures that one plans long in
advance, not on an emergency basis. Second, HHS asserted that a
blanket religious exemption could cause denial or delay that may
disincentivize the pursuit of health care. 122 This is certainly a
concern when it comes to basic health care-the kinds of services
that the whole population might seek. But in the context of gender
transitions, if there is a clear standard with regard to religious
exemptions, someone seeking a gender transition could begin at
the outset looking for a provider that will not have a religious
It is true that if all the health care facilities in
objection.
someone's vicinity have religious objections to the performance of
gender transition procedures, it may be costlier to obtain such
procedures. But that would not justify the compelled performance
of such procedures in the face of religious objections. A blanket
religious exemption, applicable to all health care for transgender
individuals, would not have been necessary. HHS's concerns about
a religious exemption, though, all have their clearest sway when
applied to basic health care, not gender transition. A religious
exemption, therefore, could have been tailored to gender transition
procedures explicitly. This was an opportunity for HHS to adopt a
measure that provided protection on both sides of the aisle, and it
failed to do so, electing instead to kick the religious freedom
23
conflicts to a RFRA analysis to be settled through litigation.
The Rule also suffers from the fact that its inclusion of gender
identity in its definition of "on the basis of sex"1 24 is a
determination of potentially great political consequence. While
needed from a policy perspective, it was in no way clear that
Congress had granted HHS the authority to make a determination
of such significance. This was a prominent concern of the District
Court for the Northern District of Texas in enjoining the Rule. As
121

Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,380.

122

Id.

123
124

See discussion infra Part V.
45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016).
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the court explained, "[t]he challenged Rule undoubtedly implicates
significant policy questions-namely, the scope and meaning of sex
discrimination prohibited by Title IX and incorporated by Section
1557. If Congress wished to assign that decision to HHS, it surely
would have done so expressly."125 This concern is warranted in
light of where the public debate on these issues stands. The Rule's
interpretation certainly attempted to make a determination of
significant political consequence. Furthermore, since the scope of
Section 1557's protections extends to both health care providers
and private insurers, the economic consequences are significant
too. So, while the HHS interpretationis the most certain way of
securing justice for a deeply antagonized class of people, it is one
that should not be made without explicit delegation from
Congress. That cannot be found in the simplistic delegation

provision of Section

1557.126

B. BIPARTISAN ADOPTION OF DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS WOULD
IMBUE THOSE PROTECTIONS WITH LASTING POWER

Despite the fact that HHS's implementation likely exceeded its
authority, and was found to have done so by a federal court, it is
imperative that Congress adopt health care discrimination
protections for transgender individuals that accomplish the Rule's
basic goal. Congressional action is preferable to regulatory action
for a number of reasons. The HHS implementation of Section 1557
is a perfect example of why. Regulatory actions are actions of the
executive, rather than of the people through their representatives
in Congress. This can inflame any opposition to whatever the
regulation provides and subject the decision to reversal with a
change in administration. This can be plainly seen in legislation
like the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 (pending at the time
of this writing) which proposes imposing extensive additional
constraints on regulatory agencies in the rulemaking process,
while subjecting finalized rules to less deferential review. 127 So, in
125 Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 687 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (citing King
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)).
126 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(c) (2012).
127 See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. §§ 103, 107 (2017)
(seeking to impose stringent requirements on agencies' rulemaking processes while
reducing the deference owed to these determinations by courts).
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light of the Rule's merits as a way to ensure access to basic health
care for transgender individuals by providing antidiscrimination
enforcement, Congress should consider doing so, whether by
amending Section 1557 itself or by extending Title IX's protections
explicitly to discrimination with respect to gender identity.
At the same time, mere congressional action would be
insufficient-and unlikely until at least the 2018 midterm
election-if adopted along party lines. The move towards the
ACA's immediate repeal following the Republican sweep of 2016
reveals how party-line legislation can be subject to political
backlash should the opposing party come to occupy both the White
House and majority control of Congress. But bipartisan legislation
usually requires compromise in the first instance, especially when
Given the
dealing with a particularly divisive issue.
vulnerabilities cited in Part III, there needs to be give and take in
the hopes of enacting protections as quickly as possible, while
ensuring that they are as politically sustainable as possible. While
partisans certainly may not be delighted to hear the word
"compromise," that is the best way to produce lasting legislation
that will provide needed protection to the transgender community.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD PROVIDE EXPLICIT CARVE-OUTS FOR
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF GENDER
TRANSITION PROCEDURES

In order to achieve the discrimination protections advocated for
in this Note, any. legislation needs to provide explicitly for a
religious exemption for providers from the performance of gender
transition procedures. While this is practical in terms of getting
bipartisan support for any such legislation, it also is consistent
with the current understanding of religious liberty in the United
The HHS approach-kicking to RFRA any conflicts
States.
between the religious views of practitioners and health care
facilities and the types of procedures sought by patients-is
It will effectively produce the same
needlessly inefficient.
outcomes as a religious exemption from gender transition
procedures, while resulting in costly and unnecessary litigation.
In fact, it already has. In addition to the cases filed by states and
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faith-based health care providers against HHS,128 a lawsuit was
filed January 5, 2017 by a transgender man alleging that a
Catholic hospital discriminated against him by refusing to provide
a hysterectomy, which was deemed medically necessary by the
patient's primary care physician to treat his gender dysphoria. 129
The plaintiff brought the case under Section 1557, as well as New
Jersey state law. 130 In order to give clarity to the scope of
nondiscrimination under any form of federal health care law,
Congress should clarify this issue by way of a religious exemption
for faith-based health care providers and physicians from
performing gender transition procedures.
A. THE RFRA FRAMEWORK

In the ensuing litigation following HHS's implementation of
Section 1557, any allegations against faith-based health care
providers like those filed in Conforti will almost certainly fail
under RFRA. In effect, HHS was reserving the possibility of
needless, costly litigation, with no benefit on the back-end for
transgender litigants seeking access to gender transition
procedures.
RFRA and the Supreme Court's subsequent
interpretations of it in the ACA context simply would not support
a meritorious claim in such a case. By its plain language, RFRA
borrows the absolute highest standard of constitutional scrutiny,
providing:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion . .. except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person-

128 See discussion supra Section II.C.
129 Complaint for Declaratory, Compensatory, and Injunctive Relief at 3-4, Conforti v. St.
Joseph's Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-50 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2017).
130 Id. at 2-3.
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(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and
is the least restrictive means of
(2)
furthering that compelling governmental
13 1
interest.
The lenient definition of "exercise of religion" and the high
standard of the "compelling interest test" imposed on government
regulation 132 is highly likely to provide sufficient protection to
faith-based health care providers, whether litigating against HHS
as plaintiffs or defending against claims by transgender patients.
While this may be precisely what HHS claimed in explaining why
it refused to adopt a blanket religious exemption, it turns out that
HHS was too right. The reality is that this will be so universally
true that deferring to subsequent litigation to sort it out would be
highly inefficient. This is shown through the four-step analysis
under RFRA's rubric: (1) that a faith-based health care facility or
religious physician's conscientious objection to gender transition is
a sincere religious belief; (2) that a government requirement to
host or perform a gender transition procedure would substantially
burden the exercise of religion; (3) the government does not have a
compelling interest in equal access to gender transition
procedures; and (4) even if it did, that requiring a faith-based
provider or physician to host or perform a gender transition
procedure is not the least restrictive means available by which to
achieve that interest.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b)(2) (2012).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (citations omitted) ("Sweeping
coverage ensures [RFRA's] intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and
prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject
matter.... Any law is subject to challenge at any time by any individual who alleges a
substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion."). The Court in City of Boerne
went on to hold that RFRA was so sweeping, in fact, that it could not constitutionally be
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, though it remained in force as to
the federal government. Id. at 536.
131
132
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B. THE RFRA ANALYSIS

The first question under the RFRA analysis is whether
something is a "sincere belief."'13 This is such an easy bar to clear
that virtually every assertion by a faith-based provider or religious
physician with regard to gender transition will qualify. That is
especially true in a case where, unlike in Hobby Lobby, providers
are not seeking to be financially compensated, a clear sign of
sincerity. RFRA defines "exercise of religion" by reference to the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA),34 which defines the term: "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief."'135 When an exercise of religion need be neither "compelled
by" nor "central to" a belief system, there is ample space along the
margins of belief systems to find a sincerely held religious belief.
That perhaps explains why this element in the analysis is often
conceded by parties seeking protection by way of governmental
action as against the opposing party or parties' purported religious
exercise. 136 In the context at issue here, many of the religious
entities likely to find themselves in court over conscientious
refusal to perform gender transition procedures will be affiliated
with the Catholic church, which has a well-known stance
regarding matters of sexuality and gender. 137 Given that similar
beliefs are held in a number of religions, the sincerity of the belief
is not where these battles will be won or lost-they will always be
sincere in a court's eyes.
133See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014) (citing
United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718-19 (10th Cir. 2010)) ("To qualify for RFRA's
protection, an asserted belief must be 'sincere'; a corporation's pretextual assertion of a
religious belief in order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would fail.').
134 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4).
135 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
136 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (providing that none of the parties in the case
had asserted that the closely held corporations' religious beliefs were insincere); Holt v.
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) ("Here, the religious exercise at issue is the growing of a
beard, which petitioner believes is a dictate of his religious faith, and the Department does
not dispute the sincerity of petitioner's belief.").
137 See, e.g., Mike McPhate, Pope Francis' Remarks Disappoint Gay and Transgender
Groups, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/europe/popefrancis-remarks-disappoint-gay-and-transgender-groups.html
(quoting Pope Francis as
referring to schools teaching children that they can choose their gender as "ideological
colonization").
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Second, it is just as clear that a federal law requiring a facility
to host or an individual to perform gender transition procedures in
opposition to their sincerely held religious beliefs will be a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion in every case. Under
Section 1557, those who commit sex discrimination are subject to
the enforcement mechanisms provided by Title IX.138 Pursuant to
Title IX's framework, this would appear to mean at least the
revocation of the federal funding that brings the entity within the
scope of Section 1557 in the first place. Given most health care
providers' hefty reliance on Medicare, and the fact that Medicare
would fall within the meaning of federal financial assistance in
Section 1557, this is most certainly a substantial burden. 139 This
is, of course, not including any damages owed to plaintiffs who
might be able to bring a successful claim of intentional
discrimination.1 40 The severe economic consequences of refusing to
abide by the ACA's contraception mandate proved critical in the
Court's finding of a substantial burden in Hobby Lobby.1 41 A loss
of all federal financial assistance under Section 1557 would be
similarly daunting.
Third, upon finding a substantial burden on a sincerely held
religious belief, a court in these cases will be highly unlikely to
find a compelling interest in equal access to gender transition
procedures. For one thing, contraceptives have been an accepted
medical product for much longer than gender transition
procedures. It is true that the Court in Hobby Lobby assumed,
without analysis, that the government had a compelling interest1 in
"cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods." 42
But in part, this conclusion relied on directly applicable
In addition, the Court found coming to a
precedent. 143
determination on this point unnecessary, given that the
governmental action subsequently failed the "least restrictive

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012).
See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
140 See Watson, supra note 47, at 880 (detailing a Section 1557 plaintiffs options for
redress, including damage remedies for intentional discrimination claims).
141 134 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
142 Id. at 2780.
143 See id. at 2779-80 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)) ("Under
our cases, women (and men) have a constitutional right to obtain contraceptives .. ' ).
138
139
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means" test. 144 It is more likely in this context that the federal
government has a compelling interest in curbing discrimination in
the provision of basic health care, rather than gender transition
specifically.
That is why federal legislation should provide
discrimination protections in the health care context, but with a
religious exemption for gender transition.
Finally, because the government's compelling interest in this
area is in basic discrimination protections, not gender transition
access, there would be less restrictive means of addressing those
concerns than requiring providers to provide procedures to which
they hold sincere religious objections. 145 Hobby Lobby relied on a
less restrictive means that HHS itself had used in the context of
an accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious
objections. 146 HHS thus failed to show that its measures, as
applied to closely held corporations, were the least restrictive
means available. 147 Furthermore, while the Court in Hobby Lobby
expressly limited its holding to the ACA's contraceptive
mandate, 148 it is difficult to see how similar reasoning would not,
in every case, defeat a claim of discrimination by way of refusing to
provide gender transition services. If, as this Note asserts, the
only compelling interest here is discrimination at the basic health
care level, there are a number of ways that the government could
address discriminatory conduct without alluding to gender
transition procedures. 149 Because litigation seeking to enforce
Section 1557 against a health care provider or practitioner with
religious objections to gender transition will fail every time under
the RFRA rubric, it will result in a needless waste of resources.
HHS should have followed-and any future legislation should
follow-Title IX's lead and adopt a religious exemption narrowly
tailored to the gender transition context.
Id. at 2780.
If the government did have a compelling interest in equal access to gender transition
procedures, the least-restrictive-means standard would be more contentious. It is the
position of this Note, however, that the government's compelling interest here is in
preventing discrimination in basic health care, not in ensuring equal access to gender
transition.
146 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
144
146

147

Id.

Id. ("We do not decide today whether an approach of this type complies with RFRA for
purposes of all religious claims.").
149 See discussion supra Part III.B.
148
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Even still, assuming that there is a compelling governmental
interest in equal access to gender transition procedures, there
likely remain less restrictive means of achieving that end than
compelling the performance of those procedures in the face of
religious objection. The less restrictive means offered in Hobby
Lobby was that the government could cover the cost of the
contraceptives at issue 150 or, alternatively, that HHS could
implement for closely held corporations the same accommodations
it had made for non-profit organizations-severance of coverage
15 1
for the objectionable contraceptives from the group health plan.
Here, since the substantial burden has to do with performance
instead of payment, the Hobby Lobby suggestions would not
suffice. One potential solution is that the government could
with
associated
costs
minimal
relatively
the
provide
transportation to a facility that does not have a religious objection
where an individual below a certain income threshold is
surrounded by health care facilities with religious objections.
Under the legislation recommended by this Note, a secular health
care facility would not be able to turn away someone for whom
gender transition procedures have been classified as medically
necessary to treat their gender dysphoria. As such, this situation
would be limited in occurrence, and transportation costs would be
a small price to pay in exchange for a policy that would be less
restrictive on the free exercise of religion.
Nondiscrimination in health care for transgender individuals is
Religious liberty conflicts
a needed federal protection.
to come out, however, in
likely
are
transition
surrounding gender
favor of a faith-based health care provider. It is senseless not to
include a religious exemption in the narrow context of gender
transition procedures. This would serve as a much more efficient
filter on the front end that would provide clarity and keep
litigation costs to a minimum.
VI. CONCLUSION

The need to address discrimination in the health care context
for the transgender community could not be clearer. In that
150 134 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
151 Id. at 2782.
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context, transgender people are either enduring vile treatment or
avoiding health care in the interest of self-protection. There are
enough challenges in access to health care without the biases of
health care providers also serving as an obstacle. Because this is
an overarching issue without localized nuances, federal protections
have the greatest potential for achieving the needed effect.
However, these protections need to be limited in light of the
prevalence of sincerely held religious beliefs with respect to gender
transition. Federal protections, therefore, should be implemented
with specific religious exemptions from the performance or hosting
of gender transition procedures by physicians or faith-based
facilities with sincerely held religious objections. This is the most
principled approach in terms of honoring a diversity of
perspectives on a complicated issue. This is likewise the most
likely path to legislation that would pass with bipartisan support.
Such a goal is necessary at a point in American history rife with
ideological divides and political extremism.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2017

41

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2017], Art. 8

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss1/8

42

